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Brothers Lorenzo and Angelo Poncini are part of a family business in the Trentino region of northern Italy. It
began as a trucking firm but diversified over the years. One such diversification is grape growing, which began
in 1988. The Poncini family sends its grape harvest, currently Pinot Grigio, to a local cooperative, Gruppo
Italiano Cantine, which makes and markets the wine. However, the vines the family originally planted - a
major proportion of the planting surface - are getting past their prime and the quantity, if not the quality, of
the family's grapes will soon begin to decline. Lorenzo and Angelo disagree about what strategy the family
should use to respond to this situation. Lorenzo favors grubbing up the older vines and applying for EU
subsidies to replant, perhaps even with a new grape variety, Glera, whose popularity has increased sharply in
recent years, like the wine which it is used to make: Prosecco. Grubbing up and replanting would also create
an opportunity to mechanize the harvest, which would reduce the cost of hand-picking in the future. Angelo
sees things differently. While he recognizes that the vines are getting old he is reluctant to grub up hurriedly
and even more so to rush into planting a new grape variety like Glera, whose market staying power is
unproven. The Poncini family business recently started using a family council to help it resolve family and
business disagreements and, at the recommendation of Carlo, the oldest of the brothers, Lorenzo develops
some strategic options to present to the council. The case requires students to adopt the position of an
external member of the council and advise the family what it should do. As the Poncinis run a family business,
the likely effects of each option on the family are as important as their financial effects.
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GRAPPLING WITH GRAPES: DEVELOPING STRATEGY FOR THE PONCINI 
VINEYARDS 
Mary A. Barrett, Wollongong University, New South Wales, Australia 
Luca Gottardi, Wollongong University, New South Wales, Australia 
Ken Moores, Moores Family Enterprise, Queensland, Australia 
 
Synopsis 
Brothers Lorenzo and Angelo Poncini are part of a family business in the Trentino region of 
northern Italy. It began as a trucking firm but diversified over the years. One such 
diversification is grape growing, which began in 1988. The Poncini family sends its grape 
harvest, currently Pinot Grigio, to a local cooperative, Gruppo Italiano Cantine, which makes 
and markets the wine. However the vines the family originally planted – a major proportion 
of the planting surface – are getting past their prime and the quantity, if not the quality, of the 
family’s grapes will soon begin to decline. 
Lorenzo and Angelo disagree about what strategy the family should use to respond to this 
situation. Lorenzo favors grubbing up the older vines and applying for EU subsidies to 
replant, perhaps even with a new grape variety, Glera, whose popularity has increased sharply 
in recent years, like the wine which it is used to make: Prosecco. Grubbing up and replanting 
would also create an opportunity to mechanize the harvest, which would reduce the cost of 
hand-picking in the future. Angelo sees things differently. While he recognizes that the vines 
are getting old he is reluctant to grub up hurriedly and even more so to rush into planting a 
new grape variety like Glera, whose market staying power is unproven.  
The Poncini family business recently started using a family council to help it resolve family 
and business disagreements and, at the recommendation of Carlo, the oldest of the brothers, 
Lorenzo develops some strategic options to present to the council. The case requires students 
to adopt the position of an external member of the council, and advise the family what it 
should do. As the Poncinis run a family business, the likely effects of each option on the 
family are as important as their financial effects.  
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The authors developed the case for class discussion rather than to illustrate either 
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It was December 2015 and two brothers, Carlo and Lorenzo Poncini, sat together at the long 
dining table of the family’s holiday house in the mountains. Carlo and Lorenzo were the 
oldest and the youngest, respectively, of the four children of Gianni and the late Arianna 
Poncini. Another brother, Angelo, and a sister, Emilia, were the middle siblings. Christmas 
was over and most members of the extended Poncini family had already left. Carlo and 
Lorenzo were almost ready to leave too. While the gathering had been cordial and full of the 
usual family jokes, there had been some tension in the air. Carlo decided to broach the issue 
with Lorenzo.  
“It’s clear that you and Angelo don’t see eye to eye about our grape growing,” Carlo said. 
You think things should be done differently – grow a more lucrative grape variety and find 
savings by harvesting mechanically rather than by hand. Angelo is more cautious and these 
ideas make him nervous. That’s understandable – he has been in charge of managing the 
vineyards for a long time. And there’s been a worldwide recession in the last few years while 
you’ve been studying and our business has been affected, like everyone else’s. How can we 
be sure that things will work out the way you hope?”  
Lorenzo said nothing so Carlo continued. “Remember, we have a family council now.” He 
was referring to the fact that in the latter part of 2015, and with some difficulty, the Poncini 
family had begun to formalize its processes for making decisions about family and business 
matters. It now met regularly as a family – not including spouses – to try to talk things over 
instead of getting angry with each other. “So why don’t you and Angelo use the council to try 
to get an objective view of your ideas?” Lorenzo sighed and sat down at the dining table, 
which before the Christmas festivities had been the scene of a rather fiery family council 
meeting. “Yes, you’re right. But I don’t think Angelo is ready to listen. He can’t see beyond 
what we’ve always done, same old grapes, same old methods….” Carlo remonstrated gently 
with Lorenzo. “Well, at least he agrees with you on one thing: a lot of our vines are getting 
old. And there’s no point in doing something new just for the sake of it. It has to be 
worthwhile for the family.”  
Lorenzo picked up the financial documents the family had discussed at their council meeting. 
(See Exhibits 1 and 2). He shook his head as his eyes ran over the figures.  
Place Exhibit 1 here. 
Place Exhibit 2 here. 
Lorenzo said, “I understand that. But there’s no disguising the fact that we made an operating 
loss in 2014!” Carlo interrupted him gently. “Well, it’s been tough for everyone in Trentino, 
not just us. As I said, maybe discussing it with the family council could give us all a fresh 
perspective. Why don’t you present some options at the next meeting? It’s December now, 
and I know you would like to implement your ideas at the next harvest, but we should get our 
council’s insights first. I can call a meeting in a few days, if you like.”  
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As the youngest family member and having only recently finished his studies, Lorenzo 
appreciated Carlo asking for his ideas. Angelo, on the other hand, had been annoyed when 
Lorenzo drew attention to the net loss from the family’s grape growing in 2014. Lorenzo felt 
Angelo was getting impatient with what he perceived as criticism from his kid brother. That 
was the trouble with being a family business, Lorenzo thought. You could never really keep 
family and business decisions apart… 
The Italian wine industry 
The variety of Italian wine is appreciated worldwide, and Italy’s wine-producing regions are 
among the oldest in the world. Italy also produces the largest amount of wine by volume of 
any country: about 45-50 million hectolitres per year, about one-third of the world’s 
production (European Commission, 2016). As well as being exported around the world, 
Italian wine is extremely popular in Italy. Italians are the fifth largest group of wine 
consumers in the world by volume.  
Wine has always been subject to a high level of regulation in terms of both its method of 
production and nomenclature, e.g. its place of origin. The various types and levels of wine 
regulation are shared between various levels of the Italian government and the European 
Union (EU), and there are changes from time to time in terms of which body regulates what. 
The distinctions between specific ways of describing Italian wines are complex. To take 
Prosecco DOC as an example, the acronym DOC refers to the Controlled Designation of 
Origin (DOC) status of the Prosecco wine style. This means the wine must comply with very 
strict rules in a specific geographical area which is historically renowned for its Prosecco 
production. The environmental conditions of the area, such as soil characteristics and climate, 
give it its characteristic qualities. The DOC appellation adds considerably to the prestige and 
thus the price of the wine. The term Denomination of Controlled and Guaranteed Origin 
(DOCG) is an even more tightly controlled (and therefore even more prestigious) wine 
designation. In 2008 the EU formally abolished the distinction between DOC and DOCG in 
favor of PDO (Protected Designation of Origin). However the greater value attached to 
DOCG meant that Italian growers and wine-makers did not want to abandon the DOC/DOCG 
distinction, so they continue to use both terms (Italian Wine Central, 2014).  
Italian wine production is highly fragmented in terms of both vineyard size and the number of 
farms, leading to grape growing virtually everywhere in Italy. In 2014 almost 390,000 farms 
had vineyards; their average area was only 1.7 hectares. Twenty-nine percent of the vine area 
was managed by 69 percent of the farms, which were less than 5 hectares each. Farms larger 
than 20 hectares were only 7 percent of the total, but managed 33 percent of the national vine 
area. See Exhibit 3. 
 
Place Exhibit 3 here. 
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Both the number of Italian wine farms and the total land area used for viticulture have 
decreased greatly since the early 1980s, yet over the same period the areas intended for 
protected designation of origin (PDO) products have increased (see Exhibit 4). 
 
Place Exhibit 4 here. 
 
There are two groups of wine producers: the thousands of small farms producing small 
amounts of wine (often for their own consumption) and highly professional farms which 
produce high volumes of wine. There are clear differences among the two groups in terms of 
production costs, level of vertical integration of the production process, relationship with the 
market, and production philosophy. This leads to a strong fragmentation of the wine 
production process, resulting in a reduction of the value accruing to grape growers.  
As evidence of this fragmentation, Italy has a very high number of establishments which 
process grapes into wine (Malorgio et al., 2011). They are of three types: farm-based 
wineries, which convert grapes produced on the farm and purchased on the market; industrial 
wineries, which process wine grapes exclusively purchased on the market; and cooperatives, 
which process their members’ grapes but also grapes purchased on the market. Cooperatives 
account for the bulk of wine production, but farm wineries are the most numerous even 
though they are smaller in size and produce less wine. In addition to wine processing 
establishments there are also numerous bottlers since bottling is often not economically 
feasible for small farm-based wineries. 
 
Gori and Sottini (2014) point out that the end result of this high level of specialization of the 
Italian wine production sector is strong fragmentation of the supply. With the exception of 
large-scale enterprises that can vertically integrate the production process and reach the final 
market directly, farms are not able to work together. As a result, farms are price-takers, who 
find it difficult to achieve fair returns for their production inputs. Cooperatives aim to 
mitigate this problem by negotiating prices on behalf of their member farmers in a particular 
location, and marketing the location’s wines. 
The history of the Poncini family and its businesses 
Lorenzo, Angelo, and Carlo were members of the third generation of the Poncini family-in-
business. See the genogram in Exhibit 5. 
Place Exhibit 5 here. 
Ernesto, Lorenzo’s grandfather, started the business the business in 1949 when he bought the 
first truck in Cembra, a poor village in the valley of the same name close to Trento
1
. The 
truck eventually replaced the two horse-drawn carts Ernesto had used to carry produce and 
                                                          
1
 Trento is the capital of Trentino-South Tyrol Region (Regione Trentino Alto Adige). This region has two 
autonomous provinces: the Province of Trento and the Province of Bolzano/Bozen. 
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liquor between the city of Trento and the surrounding valley. Within a few years, Ernesto and 
his wife Ursula acquired an employee and another truck to take advantage of growing 
transport links outside the Cembra area and the development of wood and porphyry 
production. (Porphyry is a hard, decorative stone used in building.)  
In 1957, Ernesto moved his family moved to Trento and bought a large property on Dosso 
Dossi Street which was big enough to accommodate himself, Ursula and his siblings and their 
families. The property had a large space at the back where Ernesto stored and maintained his 
trucks himself, allowing him to save money. The family began to invest in property, and at 
the time this case was written, they owned 15 flats. However, not all was well. As a 
consequence of conflicts between Ernesto and his sons Rocco and Nicola, and to some extent 
Mia, the family decided to dissolve the truck business, which in 1967 comprised six trucks. In 
1968 Gianni, with support from Ernesto and Ursula, opened his own transport company: 
Gianni Poncini Trasporti. The new company had just one truck. Ursula managed the back 
office of the new company as well as the original firm.  
The new business expanded. Gianni’s much younger wife, Arianna, helped with its 
management, just as Ursula had with Ernesto’s firm. However conflicts between Gianni and 
his siblings continued and in 1977 Gianni and Arianna moved away from Dosso Dossi Street, 
buying a piece of land in the countryside where they built a house and premises for their 
truck company. Later that year a second company was established: SAPG Autotrasporti, also 
managed by Arianna. The 1970s also saw the construction of a block of 10 flats in the nearby 
district of Canova; for many years the rentals from this property financed other family 
business projects. In 1981 the family purchased more trucks. 
The Poncinis started growing grapes in 1988 after Gianni inherited two cornfields from some 
distant cousins. Gianni converted these cornfields, totaling 4.84 hectares in the nearby 
province of Vicenza in the Veneto region, into vineyards. He planted them with Pinot Grigio 
using the pergola vine-training method. See Exhibit 6. 
Place Exhibit 6 here. 
This method was well suited to Veneto’s sloping terrain and yielded good quality grapes, but 
it had the disadvantage of not allowing mechanical harvesting. The grapes were always hand-
picked which cost more, but preserved the grapes’ quality better than mechanical harvesting. 
Later (see Exhibit 8) Gianni bought more land nearby on which he also planted Pinot Grigio, 
but this time used the Guyot method of vine training, which is compatible with mechanical 
harvesting (For a view of the Guyot approach, see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eO_zyG5BGTg).  
The second land purchase brought Gianni’s total grape-growing area to 7.3 hectares, 
considerably more than the average family-owned vineyard which was less than one hectare. 
Nevertheless, the Poncinis were not in a position to impact the wine market on their own. 
Joining together with other farmers and sending their grapes to the nearby cooperative, 
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Gruppo Italiano Cantine (GIC), meant they could benefit from GIC’s brand strength and 
reputation for quality wines grown on Veneto’s steep slopes. GIC was founded in 1858 and 
became a co-operative in 1948. Since the mid-1980s, it had taken a leadership role in the 
region’s wine industry, increasing production quality and developing market awareness of the 
‘terroir’ (special soil and climate qualities) of each local viticultural area.  
Place Exhibit 7 here. 
Grape growing was not the last of the Poncini business’s diversifications. In 1996 at the age 
of 63 Gianni acquired the retail outlet Porospan 2000 which sold construction tools and 
materials. This activity, along with grapes and property investments, gave further financial 
support to the Poncini firm’s activities. Gianni also established a new company, Immobiliare 
2000, which mainly served as a ‘shell company’ to Poncini Autotrasporti, renting premises to 
it, paying the interest on its debts, and generally serving as a barrier against any financial 
problems. These were not long in coming: by 2005 Poncini Autotrasporti had started to lose 
money as a result of a dramatic increase in competition. At the time of writing the case, the 
Poncini Autotrasporti bank account was overdrawn to the extent of EUR 115,000 from a limit 
of EUR 120,000. 
In the first decade of the 21
st
 century, Gianni’s children’s paths in life were starting to 
become clear. Carlo and Angelo had studied accounting at high school and entered the 
trucking business straight from high school, Carlo on the transport side and Angelo in 
management. Emilia also entered the family business after graduating high school in 2000, 
working in Poncini Autotrasporti as a secretary and then setting up and managing its 
computer systems.  Lorenzo, unlike the others, did university study, focusing on economics, 
including the economics of wine.  
The family had a high propensity for conflict. Ursula had died in 1974 and Ernesto died 
intestate in 1976. All four of Ernesto’s children argued among themselves over the 
inheritance, especially the property at Dosso Dossi Street. The dispute ended only in 2002 
when Rocco, ill and in debt, sold his share of the property to Gianni. Gianni, after selling 
some flats to finance the purchase, owned a majority share of the Dosso Dossi Street property 
and formally transferred this asset to his children. This dispute was resolved, but others arose 
between Gianni and various members of Arianna’s family. One dispute, over the leadership 
of a stone-crushing company Gianni had established with some of Arianna’s relatives, 
affected Poncini Autotrasporti. Carlo (via Poncini Autotrasporti) had bought shares in the 
new company, but it failed to thrive and Carlo had to sell the shares at a loss. This event hit 
Poncini Autotrasporti hard, because the company was already suffering the effects of 
increased competition. But Gianni, who was proud of Poncini Autotrasporti, always said he 
“could not understand how Carlo could lose money on it.” The disputes affected other family 
members. Emilia, for example, found it impossible to continue working for Poncini 
Autotrasporti against the background of so much conflict, and in 2006 she took a new job 
away from the family business. Despite the arguments, everyone – or at least those who were 
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not actively involved in disputes – helped manage the vineyards, especially during the 
harvest.  
Towards the end of the first decade of the 2000s, Arianna was diagnosed with cancer. The 
family started to investigate cancer and its causes and to change some aspects of their 
lifestyle, and this resulted in a change to how they grew grapes. In Lorenzo’s words: 
We [the family as a whole] found out that the environment and what you eat may play a 
role. So we changed our eating habits and began using more natural and eco-friendly 
farming practices in the vineyards. We wanted to leave better grapes and a better 
environment to future generations. It took a long time and a lot of money and hard work, 
but at the end of 2013 our vineyards were certified organic. […] Because our grapes are 
organic, GIC pays us a 20 percent price premium because a small proportion of 
consumers are willing to pay one or two euros more per bottle for a reasonably good 
organic wine, say EUR 10 for a bottle that would otherwise cost EUR 8. We supply only 
about 4 percent of GIC’s grapes by volume, but we supply 94 percent of their organic 
grapes.  
In 2010 at the age of 60, Arianna died. This had a strong impact on the family. Lorenzo said 
in 2015:  
She [Arianna] was such a calming influence on the whole family, which meant we had 
fewer family and business conflicts. It was so strange that she should die before my 
father, despite being so much younger. We still feel lost without her. And we don’t 
always keep our tempers when we have business disagreements.  
Arianna had managed many of the Poncini family’s business activities, and after her death 
they were reorganized. A summary of developments in the business after Arianna’s death 
follows. 
TRANSPORT Carlo became CEO and the sole owner of Poncini Autotrasporti by buying 
out all the other shareholders; Gianni was nominated chairman. Carlo then went into two 
external partnerships. With the first partner in 2012 he opened a second truck company, 
Ecotrasporti Poncini, whose main activity was the transportation of waste. Carlo and the 
partner were the shareholders, and the partner helped Carlo get the necessary permits. Carlo 
thought the new business would be more profitable and have fewer competitors than the 
original truck business. However, the new company registered a major loss in its first year 
and the partner left at the beginning of 2013. Carlo merged Ecotrasporti with Poncini 
Autotrasporti and hired a consultant in business finance and auditing, but this person also left 
after six months without making significant changes. Lorenzo and Angelo agreed to 
mortgage some flats to help Carlo out, but the bank was still reluctant to lend more money to 
the truck company.   
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CONSTRUCTION RETAIL Porospan 2000 closed in 2012 when the brick manufacturing 
company which supplied it went bankrupt. Angelo and his wife Maria later restarted the firm 
as a separate entity from the family business, under the name Porospan, with Angelo as CEO. 
PROPERTY Lorenzo had obtained a qualification in property management and began 
managing the two property businesses, Immobiliare Poncini and Immobiliare 2000, and the 
apartments in Canova. Angelo helped with this when Lorenzo was preoccupied with study.  
GRAPE GROWING Carlo, Angelo, Emilia, and Lorenzo were equal shareholders in the 
grape-growing business with Angelo as CEO. Angelo, who was formally registered with GIC 
as the farmer, represented the Poncini family in its dealings with the cooperative.  
GOVERNANCE In 2011, at the age of 78, Gianni decided to step down as head of the 
family firm, and passed his properties and company shares to his children. In the following 
few years his health began to decline. In 2015 the family began having semi-formal meetings 
where they discussed family and business matters.  
A timeline summarizing the development of the Poncini family business is at Exhibit 8. 
Place Exhibit 8 here. 
As Lorenzo and Carlo drove back to Trento, Lorenzo was quiet, his mind preoccupied with 
how to present his ideas to present to the family council. In the quiet of his flat in the Dosso 
Dossi street house, he opened a computer folder. First, he checked production data for Italy’s 
most popular grape varieties. (See Exhibit 9.) 
Place Exhibit 9 here. 
As Lorenzo saw it, Pinot Grigio – the grape the family had planted – was still a very popular 
grape among Italian producers. However a new varietal, Glera, had gained popularity quickly 
over the last several years. While Pinot Grigio had long been the flagship of Italian grape 
varieties, Glera was different: back in 2002, it had ranked only thirtieth in terms of 
production volume. It was an excellent grape for Prosecco wine, for which the Veneto region 
was famous. Glera was one of the most ancient of the approximately 2,000 wine grape 
varieties in Italy; it attained high sugars (about 25 percent, while grapes in Champagne 
(Champagne wine was Prosecco’s main competitor) had at most 17 percent to 20 percent). 
Yet it still retained high acid levels, which were essential to a balanced sparkling wine. It was 
also intensely aromatic. Producers were trying to increase its quality even further by 
improving vineyards and wine-making methods (Consorzio de Tutela della DOC Prosecco, 
n.d.).  
Place Exhibit 10 here. 
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Next, Lorenzo looked at figures about the subsidies Italian grape-growers had received for 
restructuring their vineyards (e.g. changing from one grape variety to another) and improving 
their growing methods. See Exhibit 11. 
Place Exhibit 11 here. 
Lorenzo noted from the table that there were subsidies available from the European Union via 
the Italian Ministry of Agriculture for farmers who wanted to restructure their vineyards. On 
average they had been increasing: in 2014/15 successful applicants had been subsidized at an 
average of EUR 11,740 per hectare (see the second bar chart in Exhibit 11). In 2012 the 
Veneto region had issued an official bulletin – a 15-page document filled with a great deal of 
complex legal language – about the EU’s goals in vineyard restructuring and the criteria that 
farmers seeking subsidies had to meet. Lorenzo had not studied this document in detail, but 
he knew that subsidies were granted only for one or more of the following activities: a) 
relocation of vineyards, and b) improvements to vineyard management techniques (not just 
normal renewal of old vineyards). Producers were only compensated for loss of revenue 
directly due to the activity; and subsidies were intended to contribute to the costs of 
restructuring/conversion, not cover the total cost. Lorenzo had discussed the subsidies 
available in Veneto with a farmer there who owned 3 hectares of vineyards. A few years ago 
that farmer had been granted a conversion subsidy of EUR 36,000, EUR 12,000 for each 
hectare to be grubbed up and restructured. “What I want to do is similar to what he did,” 
Lorenzo said to himself, “namely grub up our old vines, plant a new grape, Glera, using a 
better vine-training system, and harvest more efficiently. I think the Ministry of Agriculture 
will look on this favorably. But will the family council look on it favorably? I’ll need to argue 
my case. Time to do the figures….”  
The family council meeting 
A few evenings later after dinner, the family gathered together again, this time in the living 
room at Dosso Dossi street. The atmosphere was warm, but thoughtful rather than jovial. The 
council assembled and like most councils of family firms in Italy consisted entirely of family 
members, until that evening. In deference to the importance of the issue to be discussed and 
the tension between Lorenzo and Angelo, Carlo and Gianni had invited a new person, Luigi 
Graciotti, to join the council. The Poncinis knew and respected Luigi, a farmer from the 
neighboring valley, for his grape-growing skill and reputation for looking at difficult 
decisions objectively. At the same time, as the owner of a family business, Luigi also 
understood the family dimensions of business problems.  
Once pleasantries were over and everyone had a glass of wine handy, Carlo invited Lorenzo 
to present his ideas. Lorenzo had improvised a projector and screen on the living room wall. 
He also handed out a paper version of the slides he would show. The first pages were the 
profit and loss statement and statement of financial position that had been discussed at the 
meeting just before Christmas. Lorenzo stood up and turned to his audience. He first thanked 
Carlo for inviting him to present his ideas, and explained that he had used the family’s 
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financial data for 2010-2014 to ‘model’ four scenarios corresponding to four strategic options 
for managing the vineyards. He had also used the following information Angelo had given 
him about revenues from the old vineyards over the last five years. (See Exhibit 12.) 
Place Exhibit 12 here. 
He began to speak in earnest. “Angelo and I agree that our older vineyards – the 4.84 hectares 
of Pinot Grigio which were planted in 1988 – will soon be past their best. This is nothing 
unusual, it happens to all vines eventually.” Lorenzo projected the diagram below. 
Place Exhibit 13 here. 
“What we don’t know is how quickly the Pinot Grigio harvest will decline. Let’s consider 
Scenario 1. If, beginning in 2015, our Pinot Grigio declines by 5 percent a year, our revenues 
can be expected to decline by a similar amount. Scenario 1 shows this: revenues of EUR 
65,348 in 2014 have declined by 5 percent to EUR 64,467 in 2015, by a further 5 percent in 
2016, and so on. Our labor expenditure (pruning, cutting back buds, thinning out, and 
harvesting) will not change much, and I have allowed for a realistic increase in the wages we 
will need to pay. If the ‘old’ Pinot Grigio grape harvest declines that quickly, and GIC pays 
us on average the same as in the past five years, our net profit will be negative by 2021. And 
what about the rewards to us as a family? We haven’t often taken dividends, but it is 
reasonable for us to want to benefit from our grape growing. Let’s assume that, in any year 
that we make a net profit, we distribute an amount equal to 60 percent of net profit as 
dividends. Under Scenario 1, we would distribute a total of EUR 49,860 in dividends.” 
Scenario 1 is reproduced at Exhibit 14.  
Place Exhibit 14 here. 
Lorenzo paused. Everyone nodded, indicating that they understood his explanation so far. 
“Let’s turn to Scenario 2,” Lorenzo said. (See Exhibit 15.) 
Place Exhibit 15 here. 
“Perhaps we can be a bit more optimistic. Scenario 2 shows that if the Pinot Grigio harvest 
declined at only 2.5 percent a year instead of 5 percent, our net profits would not decline as 
quickly. So we would be able to pay ourselves more dividends by 2023 (a total of EUR 
97,598) but the dividends would still be declining and would stop in a few more years.” He 
paused again. Everyone nodded thoughtfully. 
“Now let’s consider what we might do about this,” Lorenzo said. We will always want to 
plant a grape which is right for our soil and climate, but why not go with something which is 
clearly ‘on trend’? Glera looks like the grape of the future. We could also be more efficient 
with our operations. If we replanted with Glera, we could take the opportunity to use the 
Guyot planting method which would allow us to harvest mechanically. This would mean we 
would hire only a few farmers instead of the 30 we hire now to help us with hand-picking.” 
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Despite his efforts to maintain a calm, objective demeanor, enthusiasm was making Lorenzo 
speak more quickly. Even so, he felt a growing skepticism in the room. “I know what you 
want to ask me,” he said. “How can we afford to replant, and where does the money come 
from for a harvester? Well, let me show you.” Lorenzo showed his audience the figures 
indicating the relative popularity of Glera and Pinot Grigio (see Exhibit 10). He then turned 
to Scenario 3 (see Exhibit 16) 
Place Exhibit 16 here. 
“We can minimize expenditure by leasing, rather than buying, a harvester,” Lorenzo said. “A 
60,000 euro harvester leased at 6 percent per annum would cost 3,600 per annum.” He then 
explained that he had carefully researched the costs of grubbing up 4.84 hectares of Pinot 
Grigio and establishing Glera and arrived at generous estimates: EUR 6,000 per hectare and 
EUR 4,430 per hectare respectively. The projected revenues were, he said, just as 
conservative. After grubbing up, the family would plant a corn crop to refresh the soil. The 
sale of the corn crop would bring in EUR 3,300 in 2016. Then Lorenzo discussed revenues. 
“I know it takes time for a newly planted vineyard to reach peak yield. So I have projected 
only a gradual increase in revenues for the new grape variety: 25 percent each year until it 
reaches peak yield in 2020. I am also assuming that GIC would pay only a modest annual 
price per hectare increase for Glera: 1 percent a year. Under the Scenario 3 strategy, 
dividends would be EUR 92,491 by 2023 and could be expected to continue.” 
“But what is your assumed price for Glera?” came a quiet voice from the back of the room. It 
was Angelo, who until now had been bent over the papers. “And what’s this item here – 
something about an EU subsidy?” Lorenzo smiled as he looked back at Angelo. “I was 
coming to those,” he said. “First, the subsidy….” Lorenzo went on to explain what he knew 
about the criteria for the EU subsidies to restructure vineyards and the subsidy his neighbor 
had received. Given that EU subsidies had been increasing consistently, Lorenzo estimated 
that he could reasonably expect an EU subsidy of EUR 62,504 in 2016, that is, the average 
for Italy in 2014 plus 5 percent in each subsequent year.  
“As for the Glera price,” he continued, “we saw earlier that our average annual revenue for 
Pinot Grigio for the last five years is EUR 14,024, so I assume GIC would pay the same price 
for our first Glera harvest. I also assume that the price would increase only a little every year, 
say 1 percent. So you see, all my estimates in Scenario 3 are quite conservative.”  
Lorenzo waited, then went on to show his last slide. There was silence as everyone turned to 
Scenario 4 (see Exhibit 17).  
Place Exhibit 17 here. 
“But GIC might be willing to pay more for Glera, as it is becoming so popular. Perhaps they 
would be willing to pay EUR 24,500 per hectare. Scenario 4 shows that situation. It is 
otherwise the same as Scenario 3. If GIC were to pay EUR 24,500 per hectare, we could 
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distribute dividends of EUR 100,169 to the family and we could expect these healthy returns 
to continue into the foreseeable future.” Relieved that the presentation was over, Lorenzo 
picked up his glass of wine. Moving towards his seat, he said, “So those are my ideas. Thank 
you all for hearing me out,” he said. “It has been good to think this through systematically. I 
am keen to know what you all think.”  
There was a silence while people absorbed what Lorenzo had said. No-one seemed to want to 
speak. So Carlo turned to Luigi. “You know our family well, Luigi, and now you know a lot 
about our grape growing. We know you are a fine grower and an equally fine business 
person. What are your thoughts? Would you like to tell us how you see the situation, and 
what we should do?” 
 
 
 
 
Note on how research data were gathered  
The case originated in discussions undertaken with the protagonist, Lorenzo Poncini, when he visited 
Australia in 2015. Lorenzo was interviewed extensively in person by the first author [name omitted], 
about the Poncini family business and its issues. After Lorenzo’s return to Italy the discussions 
continued by email. Other family members were interviewed in 2015 and 2016.  
Other sources of information included financial documents from the Poncini firm, information 
supplied by GIC cooperative, and the Italian wine media.  
The names of the business, the cooperative, and people in the case have been disguised.  
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Exhibit 1  
Condensed income statement for grape-growing operations 2010-2014 (in €) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Revenues      
Pinot Grigio sales (older vineyard)  64,324 66,844 67,661 75,125 65,438 
Pinot Grigio sales (newer vineyard) 19,945 28,461 21,799 34,282 29,262 
TOTAL revenues 84,269 95,305 89,460 109,407 94,610 
      
Expenses      
Labor       
.  Pruning 10,836 11,518 9,554 9,182 12,487 
.  Cutting back buds 20,716 18,353 21,502 30,009 26,726 
.  Thinning out 708 0 3,459 2,270 857 
.  Harvesting 5,476 4,577 7,868 9,732 10,781 
.  Other (agricultural products, 
fertilizer, etc.) 
5,847 4,318 1,873 5,497 4,779 
Subtotal Labor 43,583 38,766 44,256 56,690 55,630 
Salary (note 1) 29,603 26,488 26,988 27,306 27,478 
Depreciation 7,491 6,971 4,841 3,715 7,389 
Finance 269 270 870 908 1,492 
Overheads (note 2) 4,187 4,040 6,856 8,603 7,233 
Taxes & levies, allowances, services, 
misc. 
1,829 1,010 3,583 2,184 3,920 
TOTAL expenses 88,394 76,043 87,648 101,874 100,554 
NET profit/loss -4,118 19,278 2,066 10,001 -4,312 
 
Note 1: Salary paid to Angelo for managing the vineyards and liaising with the cooperative which processes and markets 
their grapes, Gruppo Italiano Cantine (GIC). 
Note 2: Overheads include tractor insurance, telephone, mail, transport, electricity, chancellery dues and subscriptions, 
irrigation consortium, agricultural diesel, and agricultural rental.  
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Exhibit 2 
Statement of financial position for Poncini grape-growing operations 2010-2014 (in €) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ASSETS      
Cash and bank 10,082 18,853 21,542 3,625 24,120 
Accounts receivable 0 0 0 0 2,100 
Prepaid expenses 215 348 72 0 626 
Other current assets  139,917 173,046 152,635 213,439 200,035 
Intangible assets  5,437 4,167 5,869 10,969 8,780 
Machinery and equipment 30,150 38,014 40,306 45,049 45,433 
Accumulated equipment 
depreciation 
-6,030 -8,363 -11,052 -14,057 -17,138 
TOTAL ASSETS 179,771 226,065 209,372 259,025 263,956 
      
LIABILITIES 
Accounts payable 0 0 0 290 0 
Accrued liabilities 3,346 3,145 3,080 2,573 1,870 
Other liabilities  41,361 76,078 57,384 96,690 108,534 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 44,707 79,223 60,464 99,553 110,404 
 
SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY      
Share capital 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Contribution reserve 129,183 129,183 129,183 129,183 129,183 
Other ordinary reserves 0 -4,119 7,659 10,288 18,681 
Net profit/loss -4,119 19278 2006 10001 -4,312 
Shareholders' dividends 0 -7,500 0 0 0 
TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY 135,064 146,842 148,908 146,842 153,552 
 
Source: Poncini family. (Some totals may not add precisely due to rounding.) 
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Exhibit 3 
Number of farms and total vine hectares by farm size 
 
No. of farms Hectares 
Farm size   
 0.01–0.99 ha 90,829 26,062.44 
 1–1.99 ha 75,313 44,607.46 
 2–2.99 ha 47,673 44,294.61 
 3–4.99 ha 55,728 76,753.31 
 5–9.99 ha 57,686 128,299.02 
 10–19.99 ha 34,474 124,464.01 
 20–29.99 ha 11,444 59,282.91 
 30–49.99 ha 8,444 56,294.14 
 50–99.99 ha 4,926 48,912.31 
More than 100 ha 2,364 55,325.97 
Total 388,881 664,296.18 
 
 
Source: Istat, 6th Agricultural Census. 
 
 
Exhibit 4 
Number of farms and vineyard hectares in Italy 1982-2010 
 
 
Census year 
 
 2010 2000 1990 1982 
 Farms Vine 
(ha) 
Farms Vine 
(ha) 
Farms Vine (ha) Farms Vine 
(ha) 
Total vine area 388,881 664,296 791,091 717,334 1,184,861 932,957.04 1,629,260 1,145,09
7 
Vine area for PDO 
production 
124,970 320,859 108,711 233,522 92,590 190,852 105,019 209,794 
Total % of PDO vines 32.14 48.30 13.74 32.55 7.81 20.46 6.45 18.32 
 
Source: Istat, Agricultural Census 1982, 1990, 2000, 2010. 
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Exhibit 5 
The Poncini family 
 
 Ernesto Poncini (d. 1976) 
 m. Ursula Galli (d. 1974) 
 ╓─────────────╥─────╨─────╥───────────╖ 
 Gianni (b. 1933) Nicola Rocco Mia 
 m. Arianna Santoro 
 (b. 1949, d. 2010) 
 ╟───────────╥───────────╥───────────╖ 
 Carlo (b. 1972) Angelo (b. 1974) Emilia (b. 1977) Lorenzo (b. 1981) 
 m. Marianna  m. Maria  partner: Massimo 
 ╓───────────╫───────────╖ 
 Damiano (b. 2000) Isabella (b. 2002) Marco (b. 2011) 
 
 
Exhibit 6 
Grape-growing in Veneto using pergola vine-training method 
 
Source: Ilares Riolfi via WikiCommons 
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Exhibit 7 
Map of the Veneto region and its provinces 
 
  
Source: Wikipedia Commons.  
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Exhibit 8 
Timeline showing the development of the Poncini family’s businesses 
Year Event 
1949 Ernesto Poncini buys the first truck in Cembra, marking the start of the family business. 
1955 Ernesto sells his carts, buys second truck. 
1957 Ernesto buys a large property in Dosso Dossi Street in Trento to accommodate himself, his family, his 
extended family, and to provide space for the trucks. Begins investing in property. 
1967 Ernesto’s trucking company closes following disputes with his sons Rocco and Nicola.  
1968 Gianni, Ernest’s third son, starts his own transport company (Poncini Autotrasporti). 
1970s Flats constructed in Canova. 
1987 Gianni inherits 4.84 hectares of cornfields in Veneto and converts them to vineyards. 
1988 Gianni plants the cornfields with Pinot Grigio grapes, using the Trentino Pergola vine training system. 
This system is not compatible with mechanical harvesting. 
1989 Carlo finishes high school and joins the family firm. His main interests center on the trucking side of 
the business. 
1993 Angelo finishes high school and joins the family firm. He also works in the trucking side of the 
business but is also formally registered as the farmer, in which role he manages the grape-growing 
operations.  
1996 Beginning of construction retail business (Porospan 2000), managed by Angelo. Its most successful 
product is aerated bricks. 
Emilia graduates from high school and joins the family business. She begins overhauling its 
information management processes. 
2000 Establishment of new property management company, Immobiliare 2000, which acts as a shell 
company to Poncini Autotrasporti. 
2001 Gianni buys an additional 2.46 hectares, plants more Pinot Grigio grapes, but using a different vine-
training system, Guyot, which facilitates mechanical harvesting. 
2002 Immobiliare Poncini, a subsidiary of Immobiliare 2000, is formed to facilitate the transfer of the Dosso 
Dossi Street property to Gianni’s children. 
2004 Gianni starts a stone-crushing company with Vincenzo, one of his brothers-in-law, and Poncini 
Autotrasporti buys shares in the company. However Gianni and Vincenzo quarrel, and Gianni 
eventually leaves the stone-crushing business. Poncini Autotrasporti’s shares in the stone-crushing 
company are sold at a loss, leading to some ill-feeling between Carlo and Gianni. 
2006 Emilia, upset by ongoing family conflict, takes a job outside the family firm. 
2008 Arianna is diagnosed with cancer.  
2010 Arianna dies. The family adopts a healthier lifestyle and begins investigating organic methods of grape 
growing. 
Lorenzo begins managing the family’s rental properties, assisted by Angelo. 
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2011 Gianni formally steps down and Carlo becomes CEO. 
2012 Porospan 2000 closes, later reopens as a separate entity, Porospan, with Angelo as CEO. Poncini 
Autotrasporti experiences financial difficulties. Carlo diversifies into waste transportation by 
establishing Ecotrasporti Poncini. Poncini Ecotrasporti and Poncini Autotrasporti merge, but the 
company’s financial difficulties continue.  
2013 The Poncini vineyards attain organic certification, one of very few vineyards in the region to have done 
this.  
2015 Lorenzo completes his graduate studies. He does not have a formal role in the family business beyond 
his current responsibilities of managing the family’s rental properties.  
The Poncini family begin regular council meetings to consider family and business issues. 
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Exhibit 9 
Italian production levels of the top 15 varieties of wine and table grapes 2014-2015 (in 
tonnes) 
Variety 2014 2015 
Pinot Grigio G. 16,186,244 11,407,364 
Glera B. 2,526,757 15,445, 261 
Sangiovese N. 8,532,571 19,905,485 
Chardonnay B. 7,248,348 8,648,876 
Merlot N. 4,911,540 5,256,965 
Primitivo N. 4,514,275 5,489,937 
Moscato Bianco B. 4,066,502 5,3044,367 
Catarratto Bianco Lucido B. 6,417,308 4,465,247 
Trebbiano Toscano B., 
Biancame B. 
5,182,955 4,453,494 
Sauvignon B. 3,167,334 3,439,148 
Syrah N. 2,822,629 3,102,387 
Barbera N. 3,099,733 3,054,394 
Cabernet Sauvignon N. 3,472,844 3,007,696 
Cannonau N., Tocai Rosso 
N., Alicante N. 
2,660, 441 2,751,538 
Vermentino B. Pigato B., 
Favorita B. 
2,355,077 2,782,035 
 
 Source: Adapted from Il Corriere Vinicolo 33, pp. 5, 7. 
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Exhibit 10 
Growing Glera grapes in Veneto 
(Note the wide spaces between the rows of vines, which allow for mechanical harvesting.) 
 
 
Source: Paul Barker Hemings, via WikiCommons 
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Exhibit 11 
EU support for vineyard restructuring and conversion in Italy: Average paid per 
hectare per year (in €) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Il Corriere Vinicolo 33, 2. 
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Exhibit 12 
Revenues per hectare for Pinot Grigio 2010-2014 (in €) 
 
Year Hectares of Pinot Grigio Revenues per hectare Total revenues 
2014 4.84 13,505 65,348 
2013 4.84 15,525 75,125 
2012 4.84 13,983 67,661 
2011 4.84 13,814 66,844 
2010 4.84 13,293 64,324 
  Average revenues per hectare 
14,024 
Average total revenues  
67,860 
 
Source: The Poncini family 
 
 
 
Exhibit 13 
The life cycle of a grapevine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Fregoni (1988). Text translated by the authors. 
 
  
 1 to 3 years 4 or 5 years 20 to 25 years 30 to 40 years 
Unproductive Increasing Peak productivity Old age 
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Exhibit 14 
Scenario 1: No replanting, ‘Old’ Pinot Grigio grape harvest declines at 5 percent per year 
Projected income statement 2015-2023 (in €) (condensed) 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Revenues          
Pinot Grigio sales (old 
vineyards) (note 1) 
64,467 61,074 57,681 54,288 50,895 47,502 44,109 40,716 37,353 
TOTAL revenues 64,467 61,074 57,681 54,288 50,895 47,502 44,109 40,716 37,353 
Expenditures           
Labor (see note 2)          
.  Pruning 10,715 10,823 10,930 11,037 11,144 11,251 11,358 11,465 11,573 
.  Cutting back buds 23,461 23,696 23,930 24,165 24,400 24,634 24,869 25,103 25,338 
.  Thinning out 1,559 1,574 1,590 1,606 1,621 1,637 1,652 1,668 1,684 
.  Harvesting 8,302 8,225 8,148 8,071 7,994 7,917 7,841 7,764 7,687 
TOTAL expenditures 43,422 43,856 42,291 45,159 45,159 43,593 46,028 46,462 46,896 
NET profit/loss 21,045 17,218 13,391 9,563 5,736 1,909 -1,918 -5,746 -9,573 
 
Note 1: To facilitate comparison, this condensed statement shows only the ‘old’ vineyards, as grubbing up and 
replanting (Scenarios 3 and 4) are not proposed for the ‘new’ vineyards.  
Note 2: Costs for pruning, cutting back, thinning out, and harvesting are based on the average for expenditure 
for each item in the past five years plus an annual increase of 1 percent. 
Related changes to balance sheet (in €) (condensed) 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
 
 
Total Assets (note 
1) 
271,297 278,924 286,552 294,179 301,806 309,433 317,060 324,687 332,315  
Total Liabilities 109,327 110,067 112,367 116,169 121,502 128,365 137,920 151,293 168,494  
Shareholders’ 
Equity 
          
Net profit (from 
table above)  
21,045 17,218 13,319 9,563 5,736 1,909 -1,928 -5,746 -9573  
Shareholders’ 
dividends (note 2) 
-12,627 -10,331 -7991 -5,738 -3,442 -1,145 0 0 0 Total  
41,274 
Total 
Shareholders’ 
Equity 
161,970 168,857 174,185 178,010 180,304 181,068 179,140 173,394 163,281  
 
Note 1: To take realistic account of changes resulting from other business activities, total assets are assumed to 
increase at 1/11 of the difference between total assets in 2010 and 2014. 
Note 2: The Poncini family takes dividends equal to 60% of net profit. 
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Exhibit 15 
Scenario 2: No replanting: Old Pinot Grigio grape harvest declines at 2.5 percent per year 
Projected income statement 2015-2013 (in €) (condensed) 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Revenues          
Pinot Grigio sales (old 
vineyards) (note 1) 
24,723 23,257 21,756 20,222 18,654 17,052 15,416 13,747 7,836 
TOTAL revenues 24,723 23,257 21,756 20,222 18,654 17,052 15,416 13,747 7,836 
Expenditure           
Labor (note 2)          
.  Pruning 10,725 10,823 10,930 11,037 11,144 11,251 11,358 11,465 11,573 
.  Cutting back buds 25,338 25,103 24,869 24,634 24,400 24,165 23,930 23,696 23,461 
.  Thinning out 1,576 1,561 1,546 1,532 1,517 1,503 1,488 1,473 1,459 
.  Harvest 8,302 8,225 8,148 8,071 7,994 7,917 7,841 7,764 7,687 
TOTAL expenditure 43,322 43,755 44,189 44,622 45,055 45,488 43,922 44,355 44,788 
NET Profit/Loss 22,842 21,357 19,838 18,285 16,698 15,077 13,422 11,734 5,804 
 
Note 1: To facilitate comparison, this condensed statement shows only the ‘old’ vineyards, as grubbing up and 
replanting (Scenarios 3 and 4) are not proposed for the ‘new’ vineyards.  
Note 2: Costs for pruning, cutting back, thinning out, and harvesting are based on the average for cost for each 
item in the past five years plus an annual increase of 1%. 
Related changes to balance sheet (in €) 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
 
 
Total Assets (see 
note 1). 
271,366 279,063 286,759 294,455 302,152 309,848 317,545 325,241 332,937  
Total Liabilities 104,497 102,891 101,885 101,492 101,727 102,603 104,133 98,082 97,942  
Shareholders’ 
Equity 
          
Net profit (from 
table above)  
22,842 21,357 19,838 18,285 16,698 15,077 13,422 11,734 5,804  
Shareholders’ 
dividends (see 
note 2). 
14,834 13,954 13,054 12,133 11,192 10,231 9,250 8,248 4,702 Total  
97,598 
Total 
Shareholders’ 
Equity 
166,869 176,172 184,874 192,963 200,425 207,246 213,412 218,911 222,045  
 
Note 1: To take realistic account of changes resulting from other business activities, total assets are assumed to 
increase at 1/11 of the difference between total assets in 2010 and 2014. 
Note 2: The Poncini family takes dividends equal to 60 percent of net profits whenever net profits are positive. 
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Exhibit 16 
Scenario 3: Grub up old vineyards, plant Glera, sell at average price for Pinot Grigio 2010-2014 
Projected income statements 2015-2023 (in €) (condensed) 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Revenues 
Glera sales (4.84 
hectares @ €14,024/ha) 
67,860 0 17,308 34,956 52,943 71,270 71,949 72,627 73,306 
Corn sales  3,330        
EU subsidy (2014 Italian 
average plus 5% in each 
successive year) 
 62,504        
TOTAL revenues 67,860 65,834 17,308 34,956 52,943 71,270 71,949 72,627 73,306 
Expenditures  
Lease of harvester 
(€60,000 at 6% interest 
per annum) 
 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 
Grubbing up and sowing 
corn: 4.84 hectares @ 
€6,500/ha 
31,460         
Establishing Glera, 
including trellising, 
fertilizing, planting 4.84 
ha @ €5,000/ha 
 26,620        
Labor (1) 
.  Pruning 10,715 3,647 6,099 7,378 9,297 11,251 11,358 11,465 11,573 
.  Cutting back buds 23,461 7,985 12,031 16,154 20,355 24,634 24,869 25,103 24,634 
.  Thinning out 1,459 497 748 990 1,266 1,532 1,546 1,561 1,576 
.  Harvest 7,687 2,616 3,292 2,931 3,091 3,255 3,286 3,317 3,348 
TOTAL expenditures  74,782 41,365 25,769 31,052 37,609 44,272 44,660 45,047 44,730 
Net profit/loss 
Exhibit 16 (continued 
-6,922 24,469 -8,461 3,904 15,334 26,988 27,289 27,581 28,576 
(1) Costs for pruning, cutting back, thinning out, and harvesting are based on the average cost for each item in 
the past 5 years plus an annual increase of 1%. Harvesting mechanically reduces worker time, reducing 
expenditure for this item. 
Related changes to balance sheet (in €) (condensed) 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
 
 
Total Assets (1) 271,609 279,272 286,916 294,569 302,222 309,875 317,528 325,181 332,835  
Total Liabilities 109,427 108,163 138,959 142,708 144,228 141,082 137,819 134,440 130,663  
S’holders’ Equity           
Net profit (from 
income statement)  
-6,922 24,469 -8,461 3,094 15,334 26,998 27,289 27,581 28,576  
Shareholders’ 
dividends (2) 
0 -14,681 0 -2,342 -9,200 -16,199 -16,373 -16,549 -17,146 Total 
92,491 
Total S’holders’ 
Equity 
146,630 171,099 147,957 151,861 157,994 168,793 179,709 190,741 202,172  
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(1) To take realistic account of changes resulting from other business activities, total assets are assumed to 
increase at 1/11 of the difference between total assets in 2010 and 2014. 
(2) The Poncini family takes dividends equal to 60 percent of net profits whenever net profits are positive. 
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Exhibit 17 
Scenario 4: Grub up old vineyards, replant with Glera, sell at €24,500/ha 
Projected profit and loss statements 2015-2023 (in €) (condensed) 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Revenues 
Glera sales (4.84 
hectares @ €14,500/ha) 
67,860 0 17,896 36,143 54,740 73,689 74,391 75,093 75,794 
Corn sales  3,330        
EU subsidy (2014 Italian 
average plus 5% in each 
successive year) 
 62,504        
TOTAL revenues 67,860 65,834 17,896 36,143 54,740 73,689 74,391 75,093 75,794 
Expenditures  
Lease of harvester 
(€60,000 at 6% interest 
per annum) 
 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 
Grubbing up and sowing 
corn: 4.84 hectares @ 
€6,500/ha 
31,460         
Establishing Glera, 
(trellising, fertilizing, 
planting 4.84 ha @ 
€5,000/ha) 
 26,620        
Labor (1) 
.  Pruning 10,715 3,647 6,099 7,378 9,297 11,251 11,358 11,465 11,573 
.  Cutting back buds 23,461 7,985 12,031 16,154 20,355 24,634 24,869 25,103 24,634 
.  Thinning out 1,459 497 748 990 1,266 1,532 1,546 1,561 1,576 
.  Harvest 7,687 2,616 3,292 2,931 3,091 3,255 3,286 3,317 3,348 
TOTAL expenditures 74,782 41,365 25,769 31,052 37,609 44,272 44,660 45,047 44,730 
NET profit/loss -6,922 24,469 -7,874 5,090 17,131 29,417 29,731 30,046 31,064 
 
(1) Costs for pruning, cutting back, thinning out, and harvesting are based on the average cost for each item in 
the past 5 years plus an annual increase of 1%. Harvesting mechanically reduces worker time, reducing 
expenditure on labor. 
Related changes to balance sheet (in €) 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
 
 
Total Assets (1) 271,609 279,262 286,916 294,569 302,222 309,875 317,528 325,181 332,835  
Total Liabilities 121,551 104,735 134,944 137,507 138,308, 134,194 129,955 125,590 120,817  
S’holders’ Equity           
Net profit (from 
income 
statement)  
-6,922 24,469 -7,874 5,050 17,131 29,417 29,731 30,046 31,064  
S’holders’ 
dividends (2) 
0 -14,681 0 -3,054 -10,279 -17,650 -17,839 -18,028 -18,638 Total 
dividends 
100,169 
Total S’holders’ 
Equity 
150,058 174,527 151,972 157,062 163,914 175,681 187,573 199,592 212,017  
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(1) To take realistic account of changes resulting from other business activities, total assets are assumed to 
increase at 1/11 of the difference between total assets in 2010 and 2014. 
(2) The Poncini family takes dividends equal to 60% of net profits whenever net profits are positive. 
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